leyman the Magnificent. The maintenance and the embellishment of the two mosques in Jerusalem were a source of pride to the successi~sultans.
. Towards the end of the Nineteenth Century, the cooperatian between Zionism and imperialism must have caught the attention of the Ottoman Government, which closed Palestine to Jewish immigratian when England cocupied Egypt in 1882.One.must underline here, at the outset, tha.t Zionism was not the product of the Jewish masses. it was d~veloped by the Jewish bourgeoisie and supported by all agents of imperialism. OriginaIly, Palestine was not even selected as the site for Zionist settlement: At the 5ixth Zionist Congress, for instanC'e,it was none other than Theodor Herzl, the founder of Zionism, who supported a proposal to set up a Jewish colony in East Africa.:ı But rivalry between Britain and France, and later Germany, in the Middle East, which was then mostly within the Ottoman frontiers and the struggle :forits partitioning compeIledeveryone of these colonial powers to look for new colonial acquisitions. Hence, the idea of settling Jews in Palestine appeared to provide an opportunity for colonisation, that, in their opinion, was likely not to provoke sharp military measures. They were well aware thatthe days of unrestrained colonisation were over.
Further, the intensity of class struggle at the beginning of the Twentieth Century forced imperiaIism to support all forC\3sthat opposed class solidarity of the working people. That is, the govern. ments of all the majo!' European states were objectively interesmd İn Zionism. The revolutionary forces were rapidly gathering momentum in Central and Eastern Europe, where the majority of the European Jews lived. Russia's multinational proıetariat was preparing a decisive battle. And, apart from the intellectuals, the Jewish working class was gravitating towards the 50cial-Democratic labour partieı>. The reactionary forces, in turn, were fanning national enmity and provoking clashes~Jetweenthe workers of various nationalities. it was at this point that the Palestine alternative seemed especially attractive. The religioıı factor would help to reduce Jewish participation in the revolutionary mavement in Europe. The fact that Zionism was a counrtır-revolutionary, Jewish bourgeois ideology becomes more apparent in respect to HerzI's dealings with the antiSemitic Russian Czarist ministers Witte~nd Plehve, responsible for the pogromsin Kishinev. Herzl promised the Czarist GovernmeIit to help divert the attention of the Jewish working class from revolutionary ideas. 3 Likewise, the process of class differentiation having penetrated into the Jewish masses. the Jewish bourgeoisie saw in Zionism an apportunity to gain control of the Jewish working class. Zionism, then, arose as an attempt of the pro-imperialist Jewish middle class, to create internationally and in each country. a reserve to serve Zionism's principal ally, that is, the chosen imperialist power at a given time. TheWorld Zionist Organisatian and the Jewish Colonial Trust were the expressions of this at~mpt. The "Jewish state" slogan was a means to attain .other goals. The myth af the "antiquity" af Zionism is a cover to conceal its class content.
One may remember here that the founders of Zionism identified this creed with the cause of white settlerdom and that their idea af the proposed Jewish state served the requirements of private capitaL.Even prior to Herzl, the Zionist writer Moses Hess advocated the view of history that the race struggle was the principalone. He had reversed the socialist vlew that racism was a cover for class interests. it is more than symbolical that the original draft of Herzl's
The Jewish 8tate was entitled An Address to the Rothschilds. When Herzl said that he was endeavouring to fonn a wall of defence for Europe in Asia, he was actually promising the Eurapean upper bourgeolsie, a big new market. His insistence on the Jews constituting Ein Volk (One Peo'ple) aimed to help coneeal the Jewish bourgeois exploitation of the Jewish working class. He alsa provided argument for the anti-Semites who channelled part of the patential af class struggle to racial struggle. lt is apparent, then, that Zionist calonisation was presented to the leading imperialist countries of Europe as a foothold for their inlfuence. it was appropriate, under the circumstances, that Abdül. hamit II. Sultan of Turkey, issued in 1885 an edict against aliens holding or acquiringI'\3al estate in Palestine and against the creation there of any further Jewish colonies. And beginning with November 1900,foreign Jews were allawed to stay in Palestine for three months as pilgrims, and they were prevented from buying land. Ben Zvi . <Iater Israeli President> and Ben Gurion <Iater Israeli Premier) were both expelled from Palestine by the Turkish Government.
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Weizmann' (also later Israeli President) wrote:
"We knew that the doors of Palestine were dosed to us. We knew that every Jew who entered Palestine was given 'the red ticket', which he had to produc'e on demand and by virtue of which he could be expelled at once by the Turkish authorities. We knew that the Turkish law forbade' the acquisition of land by Jews ..."5 Such restrictions, however, at times, became inoperative.
6 They were oJ)posed by the diplomatic representatives of the countries which enjoyed capitulatory rights within the Ottoma.n Empire. The foreign states asserted that all their national s, irrespective of religious affiliı;ı,tion,were entitled, to the same priviliges. It is of course ironical that such arguments should emanat e from the representatives of countries notorious for their anti-Semitism and that likewise such arguments be addressed to the Turks who opened up their country to the Jews persecuted in Europe.
The Ottoman Government was, nevertheless, stubbornly opposed to the Zionist aspirations in Palestine. Herzl's letter 7 of March 19, 1899,to M. Youssuf Zia AI-Khalidi may be read with interest today, in terms of the authors' complaints of the Ottoman Government as well as the Zionist promises made in it. AI-Khalidi, a Palestinian scholar and Mayor of Jerusalem (1899), was the member for Jeru. sal~m in the 'Ottoman Parliament. Herzl states in the opening paragraph that the "Jews have been, are and will be the best friends of Turkey since the day when Sultan Selim opened his Empire to the persecuted Jews of Spain." Asserting that the Zionist idea has no~ostiIe tendeney towards the Ottoman Government, he rl3asons that this movement is concerned with opening up new resources for ,the Ottoman Empire and that in allowing immigration to a number of Jews bringing their intelligence, financial acumen and means of enterprise to the country, the well-being of the entire country would be the resuIt. But in the long run, the struggle was won by the pro-British Ziomst group headed by Weizmann. A British military strategist wrote that a future Jewish state in Palestine' "would be a souree of great strength" to Britain in the Eastem Mediterranean, both politically and ultimately militarily.ıı Turkish opposition to Ziomst schemes were unwavering until the very end. The U.S. Ambassador Morgenthau's Cincinnati speech in 1916 to the effect that the Ottoman Government might be induced, after the First World War, to sell Palestine to the Jews highly annoyed the Turks. They were also disturbed by press reports that Turkey would agree to Jewish predominance under Germanpressure. Cemal Paşa, however, had turned ,down a suggestion made to him by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs during his visit to Berlin in 1917. He even stated that there would be no new Jewish immigration to Palestine and that the Jews could settle anywhere on Ottoman territory but Palestine. He made clear that the Arabs, who formed the overwhelming majority of the indig'enous population, were opposed to Zionism. Moreover, the Turks uncovered a Jewish spy-ring, under the direction of a wea1thy Jewish family, which aided the British during th~war. Actually, the Turks did not need this extra stimulus. Their attitude had been clear since the inception of Zionism.
it is well-known that, with the end of the First World War, the conquered Arab lands we~put under the Mandate System, that the Palestine Arabs were not consulted in the selection of the Mandatory Power and that Britain, which became the governing' authority, rapidly began to implement the program of the Judaization of Palestine. The developments between the two world wars of this paper. One may recall here that in 1947,Britain requested the United Nations to place the question of PaIestine on the agenda of the General Assembly. The part, played by the United States in bringing about a majority vote in favour of partitioning Palestine is also well-known.
The people, of Turkey take pride, however, that their govemment, in the 1945-1947 period, supported the Arab countries during the discussions in the United Nations on Palestine. Turkey upheld all Arab pr.oposals to give independence to the indigenous people of this land. FinaIly, Turkey has voted against the Partition Resolution. 12 it is important to indicate that Turkey stood by her own decision to oppose the partitioning of Palestine. it is common know-'ledge that some governments were forced to change their vote.' Carlos P. Romulo, for istance, explains in his Memoirs 13 the pressure brought on the President of the Philippines who changed his position. Six countries which had indicated their intention of voting against partition became,targets. They were China, Ethiopia, Greece, Haiti, Liberia and the Philippines. All except Greece failed to withstand to pressure. Turkey's stand, on the other hand, had been clear and unwavering.
Turkish attitude changed, however, as the ruling cirdes of that country sought political and eventually military collaboration with the North Atlantic group of countries, led by the United States .. Some Turks considered such association with the "West" synonymous with progress and civilisation. Very few of those who identified the interests of the country stopped to analyze the economic and social structure of the Western societies. Very many indeed adored an outer radiance of a group of states which held the torch of enlightenment during a particular stage of historical development. The Westem world, however, was something vastIy different then this outer radiance. A correct. evaIuation of the West depends, !ike many other things in the Universe, on the acceptanC'e of contradictions in it. Such omission, otherwise, puts us in no better position than the blind men who att'empt to define an elephant, each touching its trunk, leg or tail. The definition of anything, as a matter of fact, rests not only on its composing.factors, but alsa on elements which exert an influence changing its characteristics, personality or idenUty. Just like a tree has the capacity to turn into coal and earth as well as being composed of stern and leaves, the Westem soci~ty too gathers in itself contradictions in terms of origin as well as present identity. What ought to concem us is the kind of relationship that may or wiIl beestablish~d between a \Vestem world passessing certain economic, political and ideological features and a developing country like Turkey. In the West, one sees inquisition and fasdsm as well as rationalism and socialism. Such a conglomeration is doubtless a composite of contradictions. The "Wtıst" is a community of states, situated generally along the North Atlantic coast, which has destroyed feudalism in the age of bourgeais democratic revolution and entered the path of capitalist developrp.ent in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. To have entered this path some twohundred years ago means that the West has be~n successful in realizing progressive steps required at those historical moments. The societies that accomplished this forward move certainly attained conomic and political superiority over the rest of the world.. This superiority manifested itself first as colonialism and later as imperialism. Certainly, theWest has Deen able to create an island of ease and comfort on account of domestic and foreign exloitation. The further con~ntration of capital in theWest is indebted to the poor "East". Just to call or,eself a "Westem" country by name does not entan.gle one from irripoverishment.
This analysis is not a denial of Westem contribution to humanism. Progressiye and d'emocratic ideas have emerged in the West in the Age of Imperialism as well. The Westem socialists, for instance, who gaye the theory and the practice of the working class struggle, must ha~affected the Westem society in one way or another. But that progressive ideas were also mentioned in the West cannot be generalized. The genuine representati~s of the West are those who wrote the first draft of Truman's or Marshall's speeches. But after the Second World War, the West was no longer the citadel of world civilisation. History teaches us that civilisation is never under the monopoly of a single nation. There were times when the West contributed progressively to humanism. However, even then one has' to be careful over the West's usurpation of humanistic values. In th'e last few centuries duringwhich the Oriental' peoples have experieiıced a ha lt or even aretreat, the Westemers have boldly asserted that all the values that may b~termed, as hu-nıanistic contributions originated from the West. The Westem pretension to pose ÇL.S the creator of universal culture is too obvious.
When Turkey wanted to join the group of "V/estern" states, she was herself an "Eastem" country, in terms of much of her history, social structure and the aspirations of her people. But Turkey's rulers were prepared to make sacrifices for admission to Westem alliances. As a cQnsequence of this general orientation, Turkey re-<:ognized,in early 1949,the newly-created state of IsraeL. She was the, first Moslem country to do so. What is more, she endeavoured to lead the other Middle Eastem countries into the Western system of entangling alliances. Apart from herself losing the sympathy of the Arab nation, Turkey, by voluntary leadership for projects such as the Middle East Defence Organization or the Baghdad Pact, seemed easing the burden of the Westem nations bent on exploiting the resources of the area.
As far as the sheer value of the territory was concemed, General Dwight D. Eisenhower had described it as the most strategically important area in the world. 13 This evaIuation conformed with the post-war American geopolitical theories of world domination. The Mi"ddleEast was in the "rimland" of the American strategist Nicholas Spykman. 14 The Middle East Defence Organisation, proposed on pctober 13, 1951,by Turkeyand her Western friends, was certainly ill-conceived. So was the Baghdad Pact, later known as the (now defunct) CENTO. As a local Middle Eastern power, Turkey took the lead in boIstering unpopular governments to facilitate Westem influence in the area. Turkey, along with the leading Western countries, was being identified with a particular social and political cıı-que on its way out. 
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The truth, however, is that the number of people in the kibbutzim has always been a very small fraction (some six percenU of the Jewish population (non-Jews cannot be members) and that this fraction is steadily dedining, nowonly three percent.
In the eyes of the Arabs, and espeCially the Palestinians, Turkey was cooperating with the Zionist entity as described above: it is unfortunate to say the least that Turkey behaved in a way at the two London conferenees that followed the 1956Suez crisis as if she was not a Middle Eastern country herseIf, but a smaIl Western power. This was a total alienation to one's own environment and, in tact, to one's own self. But she was forced to withdrawher Ambassador in the Israeli capital, towards the end of the same year, unable to resist the pn;ıssure from various quarters. in Rabat, h~ld in reaction to the burning of the AI-Aqsa Mosque, to the effect that his country would be bound by the Rabat resolutions as much as they do not contradict the U.N. decisions. Turkey was demonstrating an effort, though limited, in trying to un-.derstandArab views. it should be noted with satisfaction that she did not allow the U.S. Sixth Fleet to utiliz~her harbours during the crisis in Jordan in 1970.This was some progress whEmone remembers that the U.S. had been able to make use of the İncirlik air base <in southern Turkey) at th~time of the 1958 Lebanese crisis.
The sine qua non of appropriate improvement in Turkish-Arab relations is a much better' understanding of the common denominator of Arab, principally Palestinian aspirations. This author had written some years ago that the struggle of the Pal~stinians against imperialism and Zionism is "useful and democratic in the interest of all the peoples of the world".and that support of the Palestinian cause meant also "strengthening our own position"P The minimum condition for the recognition of the Palestinians is their right to open up an office in Turkey. Promises to this effect were made by the present and the previous' governments. Although the present government has been in office for nearly a year-and-ahalf, its Foreign Minister has been making unfortunate statem~nts. in the Arab countries in favour of continued relations with the Zionist entity while the Palestinians a'Yait the offical permission to start their representation on Turkish soi!. The op~ning of such an office in our country will connote the Turkish recognition of the Palestinian identity and the affirmation of the Palestinian people's unity.
The Palestinians do not constitum only a refugee problem. And the conflict is not one between Israel and_the Arabs over frontiers. The Palestinians are a people, a nation. They have shown national consciousness in reaction to Jewish immigration much earlier than generally known. The most prominent symbol of this. early current was the writer Najib Nassar, who made his paper Al Carmel (1909) an inştrument opposing Zionist settıement. After the 1948 catastrophe, the Palestine people had had to counter a programmed atmmpt to eliminate its national existence. "Al Fateh" was the organisation that went ahead of all the others in presenting Palestinian thought n Türkkaya Ataöv. "Devrimci Filistin Halkına Seıam," Devrim, Ankara, Octabar 13. 1970. • The Foreign Ministry lBter denied that such statements were ever made. We. have before us, then, a people and a state apparatus, which of course ineludes a fighting force. it is this fact that led to the U.N. General Assembly vote on November 22, 1974, which granted the P.L.O. an observer's status. it is this Palestinian entity that Turkey ought to recognise without any further delay.
In addition to expectations from the official Turkish cirel\:ls,the opinion forming bodies, organs or individuals. are counted upon to enlighten the public objectively and in an unadulterated form. There are indeed very few published academic research work in Turkish revealing the truth behind the Palestine question. In comparison to what is being done in countries like Norway or Finland, geographieally quite far away from the Middle East, Turkish material is few in numbers and some are ineurable pro-Zionist. Many topies await aeademie treatment by a wide range of researehers and authors.
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What is expeeted is, of eourse, a matter of good-will and of learning. Only detailed expert study of all the -issues involved will show the student of Arab ::tffairs that the Palestine question is not one merely between tw~points of view (namely, Palestinian and Zionist), but a ease of right and wrong. The seholars and writers who volunteer to form publie opinion in Turkey should know, in due respeet to their readers and the average citizen, the correct answers to a host of questions,that eonstitute the Palestine problem. To namB just a few: Was Palestine "a land without a people" when the waves of ıionist immigration poured into it? If some Turkish writers have not been able to follow the background of the demographie reality in the history of Palestine, if they cannot reply whet-, her the Zionist movement was able to purchase land in Palestine from its inhabitants, if they fail to answer whether the Balfour Declaration is a legal doeument granting the Zionists a right in Palestine and if they have not familiarized themselves with many other facts, figures and intricacies of the problem, they can hardly shoulder the responsibility of briefing correctly th'eir readers or listeners. Further, what was the attitude of the Zionist leaders towards the Palestinian Arabs? it is very instructive to read the evaluations of the well-known Israeli writer Amos Elon. Jiow did the anti-Zionist Jews react to this a-:;titude?Was the Zionist colonizatian realized peacefully? Did those Zionists immigrating to Palestine come as labourers and farmers, or were they in fact conquerors? Were Zionist military prepa,rations in Palestine a "necessary measure" dictated by Arab attacks against Jewish settlements? Did the'Zionist movement while sBeking to ereate the Jewish state try to avoid committing an injustice against the Arabs? In what respeets, were the Zionist colonies raeialist?
Is it true that the Zionists transformed Palestine from a semidesert into a developing vital and successful eeonomy? At this point , [ cannot help but remember the remark of an educated Turk (who had just returned 'from occupied Palestine as a guest of the Israeli Government) that he was shown the blooming desert. Physieally. Palestine consists of four main sub-regions: the coastal plain, the plateau region, the Jordan valley and the southem desert.Even in the Biblical times, this country was referred to as "the land of milk and honey". George Sandys, an American poet who was one of the first travelIers to Palestine, in 1610 Let us dwell very briefly on the answer to the last question. lt is now on Zionist records that the Haganah headquarters had decided, in March 1948, to achieve "a military decision by going over to theoffensive."23 On Aprll I, the Haganah started the first of their thirteen military campaigns that made up "Plan D". The notorious Deir Yassin massacre came eight days later (on April 9, 1948). 254 peaceful Palestinians were murdered in cold blood. This is not the only example of Zionist terrorisrri. The other operations, within a matter of a few days were: Nachshon, Harel, Misparayim, Mateteh, Maccabi, Gideon, Barak, Ben Arni, Schfilon, Quazaze, Sa'sa,' Haifa, Salameh, Biyar Adas, Qana, Qastal, Lajjun , Saris, Tiberias, Jerusalem, Jaffa. Acre, Safad, Beisan...These events were never (or very poorly) reported in the Turkish press. But any Palestinian reaction is presented on the first page, often with the implication of terrorism. Let us remember that the state of lsrael was founded on terror. And it was none other than Ben Gurion who confirmed the fact that the Zionists switched to attack as April (1948) began.
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Menachem Begin admits in his Memoirs that it was they who passed to the offensive. 28 Begin is now the Israeli Premier, and the State of Israel officially recognizes Cinthe Fallen Soldiers' Families Law, Part I, No. 1) that the members of the terrorist gangs were enga~d in its "Iegaı" military service. But these activities were not undertaken in self-defence, and they were directed against civilians.
lsrael is the only U.N. member which has not submitted to that international organisation a map showing its frontiers. The Turks have to dwell in length on the meaning of such behaviour. Israel is founded on land usurped from its rightful owners. Egyptian-Israeli Agreement and at the same time a friend of the Arab natian. Israel is a country which came into being by making anather one cease to be. And the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement <;loes not only defer the just and the permanent solution of the Palestine problem, it alsa forms the' basis for a new imperialist strategy in this region. The Camp David Framewcrk is essentially the Begin' plan öf December 28, 1977. it is designed to serve the interests of IsraeI. The Agreement, between Begin, Carter and Sadat, gives a smaIl minority of th~Palestinian people a fraction of their rights on a bit of their own territory. Even this promise is conditional on a long, step-by-step process, during which Israel, as the occupying power, will have decisive vetos. Anyone with any notian of law and right should realize that it excludes the Palestinians from participating in fundamental decisions about their own d~stiny."9
The United States, it appears, has assigned to the Sadat regime and Israel new roles of policihg the region in the interests of thŨ nited States. The Sadat regime's role İn the Arabian Peninsula is illustrated by an oral agreement reach'ed between Sultan Qabus of Oman and the Egyptian Vice-President, whereby Egyptian troops are replacing those sent by the former Shah of Iran to defend Qabus' throne. This Egyptian mHitary pres~nce in Oman is part 9f plan worked out by the U.S. Department of Defence, which seeks to ensure continued G.S. control of the Gulf oil reservoir and the protection of the pro-U.s. n3gimes in th~region. 30 Great responsibility falls on the Turkish means of mass communications. But not all those who publish shoulder this responsibility. One may give arecent example out of many: A reporter of an influential Turkish daily, who had a private audi'ence with the Israeli President, wrote from occupied Jerusalem that Mr. Isaae Navon "was originally from Turkey", and that "Syria, Iraq, the P.LO. and 'the U.S.S.R. were pı"eventing the peace efforts to encompass the whole area."31The Israeli P~sident apparentıy told the reporter that, a few hundred years ago, his ancestors had eome to Turkey and again a few hundred years ago finally to Jerusalem and that he had never. been to Turkey. This hardly makes him "Turkish", but perhaps serves' the purpose of making the new EgyptianIsraeli Agreement less objectionable.
One expects, however, the Turkish means of mass communications to dwell objectiveıyon several aspects of this problem. One also expects the Turkish legalists to uphold human rights in the Israeli-occupied territories. One anticipates that our educators will soon analyze in detai! the kind of education given to Israeli pupils. Turkey Wa{> the only Middle Eastem country that did not participate in the international art exhibition for Palestine. And of course, the U.N. General Assepıbly has passed Resolution No. 3379 (XXX) of November.l0,1975, determining Zionism as a "form of racism and racial discriminatlon" for some good reasons. In connection wlth this U.N. resolution, this author. haS published several artides. 32 i have then received an envelope from the Israeli Legation in Ankara,with a single endosure, namely, the talk of the IsraeIi representative in the U.N., describing .anti-Zionism as anti-Semitism. Nothing is dishonest than the slogan, unleashed by Israel and the .United States, as the principal weapon in their campaign against thE' decision of the U.N., that anti-Zionism is anti-Semitism. This dishonest slogan is predicated on the false equation of Judaism with Zionism, and the equally false equation of Jews with Zionists. 33 In the last century and today, the greatest critics of Zionism have been and are the Jewish inte.llectuals and the majority of world Jewry.
When. i had met Yasser Arafat and Abu Jihad, some months ago, in Southern Lebanon, the latter had told me that there was practically no support of their just cause from Turkey. But the former, when asked to evaluate the Turkish support,stated that he was sure of the Turkish people's sympathy for the Palestinians. The two statements are the two sides of the same coin. The outward contradiction .will be eliminated once the gap between the official attitude and the tendencies of the people is bridged3
